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Comment

Confirming the Enforceability of the
Guaranty Agreement After Non-Judicial
Foreclosure in Georgia

. INTRODUCTION
Between 2008 and 2011, Georgia experienced seventy-four bank
failures, the highest number of failures in the nation.' Of these
seventy-four banks, sixty-nine were small banks (banks with less than
$1 billion in assets), five were "medium-size" banks (banks with assets
between $1 billion and $10 billion), and none were large banks (banks
with more than $10 billion in assets).? The majority of bank failures in
Georgia were therefore comprised of small banks with less than $1
billion in assets. Unfortunately, the failures of these community banks

1. U.S. GovT ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, GAO-13-71, FINANCIAL INSTITUTIONS: CAUSES
AND CONSEQUENCES OF RECENT BANK FAILURES 7 (2013) [hereinafter GAO REPORT],

available at http-//www.gao.gov/assets/660/651154.pdf According to the Government
Accountability Office (GAO), Georgia had seventy-four bank failures between 2008 and
2011 and is one of ten states that experienced ten or more bank failures within that time
period. Id. Out of the banks experiencing failures in these ten states, 86% had less than
$1 billion in assets, 52% had less than $250 million in assets, 12% had between $1-$10
billion in assets, and 2% had more than $10 billion in assets. Id.
2. Id. at 8.
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"were largely driven by credit losses on commercial real estate ...
loans."'
Problems associated with Georgia's anti-deficiency statute,' also
known as the confirmation statute, may have contributed to the high
number of failed lending institutions in the state. Georgia courts have
broadly construed the confirmation statute to apply to both the borrower
and guarantor, essentially extinguishing the enforceability of a guaranty
agreement, and therefore precluding the lender's ability to recover.s
Under Georgia's confirmation statute, a lender is required first to
obtain court approval, or "confirmation," of a non-judicial foreclosure sale
before pursuing a deficiency judgment against a debtor.6 In theory, the
confirmation hearing is a simple proceeding wherein the court examines
the procedural fairness of the foreclosure sale and ensures that the
property is sold for at least its fair market value.' However, in a
depressed economy, judicial and legislative concern for the "plight of
distressed borrowers, many of whom have suffered devastating losses
brought on by the burst of the housing bubble and ensuing recession,"
has transformed the simple confirmation proceeding into a "critical
battle that gives borrowers and guarantors the opportunity to eradicate
their deficiencies." Particularly troubling is the fact that confirmation
proceedings have increasingly been utilized "by commercial property
owners who rely on technical arguments to overturn a confirmation in
which they fully participated.""o
Although a valid concern exists for the plight of distressed borrowers
in a depressed economy, lenders should also be included within the scope
of judicial and legislative concern. When one thinks of a "lender,"
attention has largely focused on financial institutions that are "too big
to fail."n However, most American banks do not fall within this
category, as small, community banks constitute approximately 98% of all

3. Id. (introductory summary).
4. O.C.G.A. § 44-14-161 (2002).
5. See infra Part II.C.
6. O.C.GA § 44-14-161(a).
7. See O.C.GA § 44-14-161(b).
8. You v. JP Morgan Chase Bank, N.A, 293 Ga. 67, 75, 743 S.E.2d 428, 434 (2013).
9. Stephanie A. Everett & Ariel Denbo Zion, Representing Borrowers: Tips and Tools
for Your Defense 7; Institute of Continuing Legal Education in Georgia, Real Property
Foreclosure Program Materials 128078 (2012).
10. Ameribank, N.A. v. Quattlebaum, 269 Ga. 857, 860, 505 S.E.2d 476, 479 (1998)
(Fletcher, J., dissenting).
11. Tanya D. Marsh, Too Big to Fail vs. Too Small to Notice: Addressing the
CommercialReal Estate Debt Crisis, 63 ALA. L. REV. 321, 371 (2012).
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As one commentator

[slome of the buzz[]words surrounding the economic climate in the fall
of 2008 were "systemic risk" and "too big to fail," but community banks,
which do not pose systemic risk and are not too big to fail, face
different challenges and opportunities as a result of the financial
crisis."
Smaller banks engage in a different banking model than larger
financial institutions, and smaller banks are more likely to engage in a
model that "involves more one-on-one interaction with customers.""
Under this model, banks consider both the borrower's quantifiable,
"hard" information with the "soft" information that is "acquired
primarily by working with the banking customer." As a result, these
smaller banks are the major source of credit for small businesses, 6 as
they "may be able to extend credit to customers such as small business
owners who might not be considered for a loan from a larger bank.""
Community banks are therefore "a small-but vital-sector in the
overall health of our economy" because they "foster economic growth and
serve their communities, boost small businesses, and help increase
individual savings."
These small banks have experienced difficulty in enforcing commercial
guarantors' obligations under their guaranty agreements after extending
credit to commercial borrowers who may otherwise not have been able
to obtain a loan." The Georgia Court of Appeals, in HWA Properties,
Inc. v. Community & Southern Bank,20 however, recently upheld the
enforcement of the guarantor's obligations to the lender regardless of the
confirmation statute's effect on the borrower's liability.2 1 Although the
guarantor in HWA Properties appealed this decision, the Georgia

12. Id. The Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation (FDIC) stated that, as of 2011,
community banks made up 92% of FDIC-insured banks and 95% of all U.S. banking
organizations. FDIC COMMUNITY BANKING STUDY, 1 (2012).
13. Patrick D. Craig, Note, Citizens South: Innovative Use of TARP Funds Creates
Value for Customers, Community, and the Bank, 14 N.C. BANKING INST. 361, 362 (2010).
14. GAO REPORT, supra note 1, at 8.
15. Id.
16. Marsh, supranote 11, at 371.
17. GAO REPORT, supra note 1, at 8.
18. 155 CONG. REc. E677 (statement of Rep. Ruben Hinojosa).
19. See GAO REPORT, supra note 1, at 52.
20. 322 Ga. App. 877, 746 S.E.2d 609 (2013), cert. denied, No. S13C1731, 2013 Ga.
LEXIS 980 (2013).

21. Id. at 887-88, 746 S.E.2d at 617.
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Supreme Court denied certiorari, and the court of appeals decision
currently remains intact. 2
Part I of this Comment will provide a general overview of Georgia's
confirmation statute and its application to guarantors. Part I further
advocates that such an application with respect to commercial guarantors is inconsistent with the purpose of the statute, which has remained
relatively unchanged from its original enactment in 1935. Part II will
discuss the decision of the Georgia Court of Appeals in HWA Properties,
which upheld the enforceability of the guaranty agreement despite the
bank's failure to comply with the terms of the confirmation statute. Part
III proposes that the Georgia legislature codify the court's decision in
HWA Properties and explicitly include a provision in the confirmation
statute allowing guarantors to waive protection of the statute. In the
alternative, the legislature could substantially amend the confirmation
statute to replace confirmation proceedings with a "true market value
defense" available for debtors-both principal borrowers and guarantors-to assert in a deficiency action.
II. THE CONFIRMATION STATUTE
A lender has two primary options to pursue foreclosure in Georgia:
judicial foreclosure and non-judicial foreclosure."
Under judicial
foreclosure, the lender must first receive court authorization to conduct
a foreclosure sale; under non-judicial foreclosure, the lender can obtain
power of sale from a security deed that contains language granting that
power to the lender.' Judicial foreclosures are expensive and timeconsuming and are therefore less popular than a non-judicial foreclosure,
which is considered a "streamlined more efficient version of judicial
To facilitate such streamlining, "Georgia courts have
foreclosure."'
long held that non-judicial foreclosure is governed primarily by contract

law.P)26
A forced sale of real estate in foreclosure, whether judicial or nonjudicial, will result in a deficiency if the sale of the property does not
fully satisfy the outstanding debt.27 Historically, "it was the law of
Georgia that the holder [of a security deed] might exercise the power of

22. HWA Props., Inc. v. Cmty. & S. Bank, No. S13C1731, 2013 Ga. LEXIS 980 (2013).
23. Ann M. Saegert, CommercialLending Issues in the United States, 15 PROB. & PROP.
37, 38 (2001).
24. Id.
25. Pamela Giss, Comment, An Efficient and Equitable Approach to Real Estate
ForeclosureSales: A Look at the New HampshireRule, 40 ST. LOUIS U. L.J. 929, 939 (1996).
26. You, 293 Ga. at 69, 743 S.E.2d at 430.
27. See O.C.GA. § 44-14-161(1).
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sale contained therein, unimpeded by any such conditions as were later
embodied in [the confirmation statute]."" If the sale of the property
"did not bring an amount sufficient to satisfy the debt, the grantor would
be liable for the remainder and subject to a judgment therefor in a
proper action."29
In Georgia, a lender does not automatically gain the right to seek a
deficiency judgment after a non-judicial foreclosure; instead, this right
is subject to the requirements of the confirmation statute."

A.

Purpose of the Confirmation Statute

In the 1920s and 1930s, the shortcomings of non-judicial foreclosure
proceedings became readily apparent as the frequency of foreclosures
increased during the Great Depression.3 1 With property values
dramatically declining, the resulting revenue from the sale of foreclosed
property was nominal." At times when the economy was healthy,
competitive bidding provided reasonable assurance to the borrower that
the foreclosure sale would not yield a "grossly inadequate sale price."33
However, during the Depression, this type of borrower protection no
longer existed." Instead, a lender could receive a "double recovery

28. Atl. Loan Co. v. Peterson, 181 Ga. 266, 272, 182 S.E. 15, 18 (1935) (citing Nat'l
Mortg. Corp. v. Bullard, 178 Ga. 451, 454-55, 173 S.E. 401, 403 (1934)).
29. Id. A lender also has the option to sue the borrower directly on the promissory note
without foreclosure proceedings, and
[a] creditor who holds a promissory note secured by a deed is not put to an
election of remedies as to whether he shall sue upon the note or exercise a power
of sale contained in the deed, but he may do either, or "pursue both remedies
concurrently until the debt is satisfied."
Taylor v. Thompson, 158 Ga. App. 671, 672, 282 S.E.2d 157, 158 (1981) (quoting Oliver v.
Slack, 192 Ga. 7, 8, 14 S.E.2d 593, 594 (1941)).
A lender is therefore not required to mitigate its damages by exercising the power of sale
contained in the deed but may instead choose to sue directly on the promissory note
without foreclosing on the property. REL Dev., Inc. v. Branch Banking & Trust Co., 305
Ga. App. 429, 431, 699 S.E.2d 779, 781 (2010). If, however, a lender chooses to pursue a
suit on the promissory note, the borrower is put in "the precarious position of being sued
for the full amount owed under the loan (rather than the full amount less any credit given
for the foreclosure sale of collateral)." Everett & Zion, supra note 9, at 23-24.
30. See, e.g., Viass v. Sec. Pac. Nat'l Bank, 263 Ga. 296, 297, 430 S.E.2d 732, 734
(1993); see also O.C.G.A. § 44-14-161.
31. Giss, supra note 25, at 944.
32. Id.
33. John W. Brabner-Smith, Comment, Economic Aspects of the Deficiency Judgment,
20 VA. L. REV. 719, 725 (1934) (quoting Suring State Bank v. Giese, 246 N.W. 556 (Wis.
1933)).
34. See Maxwell M. Freeman & Elizabeth Freeman Gurev, An Overview of Defenses
Available to Guarantorsof Real Property Secured Transactions Under CaliforniaLaw, 38
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because the lender got both the land (with value greater than the bid
price) and the deficiency proceeds." 5 As a result, "many mortgagors
were forced into bankruptcy by the deficiency judgments which were
sought and obtained against them after mortgagees had acquired the
property at non-judicial foreclosure sales for nominal or reduced
prices."
In response, many states, including Georgia, enacted anti-deficiency
statutes to protect mortgage debtors from inflated deficiency judgments
after a foreclosure sale of their property.37 Georgia's anti-deficiency
confirmation statute is still in effect and largely unchanged from its
original version." The statute in its current form reads as follows:
(a) When any real estate is sold on foreclosure, without legal process,
and under powers contained in security deeds, mortgages, or other lien
contracts and at the sale the real estate does not bring the amount of
the debt secured by the deed, mortgage, or contract, no action may be
taken to obtain a deficiency judgment unless the person instituting the
foreclosure proceedings shall, within 30 days after the sale, report the
sale to the judge of the superior court of the county in which the land
is located for confirmation and approval and shall obtain an order of
confirmation and approval thereon.
(b) The court shall require evidence to show the true market value of
the property sold under the powers and shall not confirm the sale
unless it is satisfied that the property so sold brought its true market
value on such foreclosure sale.
(c) The court shall direct that a notice of the hearing shall be given to
the debtor at least five days prior thereto; and at the hearing the court
shall also pass upon the legality of the notice, advertisement, and
regularity of the sale. The court may order a resale of the property for
good cause shown."
Unlike other types of anti-deficiency legislation, Georgia's confirmation
statute is characterized as a "fair market value" statute. 40 This type
of anti-deficiency statute allows a lender to pursue a deficiency judgment
only after the lender presents sufficient evidence that the property was

SANTA CLARA L. REV. 329, 333 (1998) (describing secured property transactions in

California during the Depression).
35. Id. at 334.
36. Presidential Fin. Corp. v. Snead (In re Snead), 231 B.R. 823, 825 (Bankr. N.D. Ga.
1999).
37. Brian Henderson, Comment, Commercial Transactions: Waiver of Guarantor's
Rights in Mortgage TransactionsUnder Oklahoma Law, 51 0KLA. L. REV. 325, 341 (1998).
38. O.C.G.A. § 44-14-161.
39. Id.
40. Giss, supra note 25, at 946.
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sold for at least its fair market value.4 1 The statute did not abolish the
lender's right to collect a deficiency judgment but instead "subject[ed] it
to the condition that the foreclosure sale under power be given judicial
approval. 4 2 Notably, in 1933, two years before the confirmation
statute was enacted, a bill was introduced in the Georgia House of
Representatives to completely abolish the lender's right to seek a
However, the Georgia
judgment for a deficiency after foreclosure.'
legislature rejected this version, ultimately choosing to uphold the
lender's common law right to seek a deficiency judgment, but limited
that right by requiring the lender first to comply with the requirements
of the statute.4
The confirmation statute limits the lender's common law right to seek
a deficiency by requiring the lender first to present evidence that the
property sold for at least its true market value at the foreclosure sale.4
In addition, the court must approve the notice, advertisement, and
regularity of the foreclosure sale before issuing a confirmation order
If a lender presents evidence to the court's
approving the sale.
satisfaction, that lender is then permitted to seek the deficiency against
the borrower.4
A lender must strictly comply with the confirmation statute's
requirements.48 For example, the statute requires that the lender
"report the sale to the judge of the superior court of the county in which
the land is located.' ' Because this requirement is explicit and not
subject to more than one interpretation, a report given to the clerk of the
superior court does not comply with the terms of the statute because a
lender is explicitly required to "report the sale to the judge of the

41. See id.
42. First Nat'1 Bank & Trust Co. v. Kunes, 230 Ga. 888, 890, 199 S.E.2d 776, 778
(1973).
43. 1933 GA. H. JOURNAL 311.
44. See Kunes, 230 Ga. at 890-91, 199 S.E.2d at 778 (citing 1935 GA. H. JOURNAL at
1759).
45. Atreus Cmtys. of Am., LLC v. KeyBank Nat'1 Ass'n, 307 Ga. App. 716, 717, 706
S.E.2d 107, 108 (2011); see also O.C.G.A. § 44-14-161.
46. See Nicholson Hills Dev., LLC v. Branch Banking & Trust Co., 316 Ga. App. 857,
860, 730 S.E.2d 572, 575 (2012). One of the primary objectives of requiring proper
advertisement is to "attract buyers who will compete against one another so as to yield the
highest price." Id. (quoting Dan Woodley Cmtys., Inc. v. SunTrust Bank, 310 Ga. App. 656,
657, 714 S.E.2d 145, 146 (2011)).
47. See Martin v. Fed. Land Bank of Columbia, 173 Ga. App. 142, 144, 325 S.E.2d 787,
789 (1984) (Beasley, J., dissenting).
48. See, e.g., Goodman v. Vinson, 142 Ga. App. 420, 421, 236 S.E.2d 153, 154 (1977)
(noting that the confirmation statute's terms must be strictly construed).
49. O.C.G.A. § 44-14-161(a).
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superior court of the county in which the land is located."so If a lender
fails to abide by this explicit requirement, it will not be permitted to
obtain confirmation." Theoretically, this process appears simple-a
lender should carefully read the statute and comply with its exact
requirements. However, not all terms in the statute are so explicit,
leaving some essential requirements open to interpretation.52 In

50. Id. (emphasis added); see also Bentley v. N. Ga. Prod. Credit Ass'n, 170 Ga. App.
361, 362, 317 S.E.2d 339, 339 (1984) ("The judge himself, not the clerk of court, is the one
to whose attention the report of sale and its particulars must be brought."); Cornelia Bank
v. Brown, 166 Ga. App. 68, 69, 303 S.E.2d 171, 172 (1983).
51. See Kennedy v. Gwinnett Commercial Bank, 155 Ga. App. 327,330,270 S.E.2d 867,
871-72 (1980).
52. For example, the confirmation statute requires that the lender provide "evidence
to show the true market value of the property sold under the powers." O.C.G.A. § 44-14161(b). Under the terms of the statute, a court "shall not confirm the sale unless it is
satisfied that the property so sold brought its true market value on such foreclosure sale."
Id. Courts in Georgia have interpreted "true market value" to be "the price that the
property will bring when it is offered for sale by one who is not obligated, but has the
desire to sell it, and is bought by one who wishes to buy it, but is not under a necessity to
do so." Jimmy Britt Builders, Inc. v. SunTrust Bank, 307 Ga. App. 663, 665 n.4, 706
S.E.2d 665, 667 n.4 (2011) (quoting REL & Assocs., LLC v. FDIC, 304 Ga. App. 33, 34, 695
S.E.2d 370, 371-72 (2010)).
However, in the context of a foreclosure sale, selling the property for at least its "true
market value" in a depressed economy is inherently difficult to achieve, even for a
scrupulous lender:
Foreclosure sales are unlikely to bring "fair market value," first, because of the
time pressure involved between the decision to foreclose and the actual sale.
Often advertising is only conducted for a period of three to five weeks. The
uniqueness of real estate demands that enough time be given to find a purchaser
who is both willing and able to pay the asking price. Further, purchasers are
typically apprised of the lender's desire to sell; thereby reducing the amount the
purchaser is willing to put forward. Finally, title is rarely as stable in foreclosure
sales, reducing the marginal benefit to the purchaser of bidding on the property.
Giss, supra note 25, at 947 (citations omitted). Furthermore, Georgia courts require that
the lender put forth evidence establishing the value of the property when the sale was
made. Id.
How, then, does a lender establish the property's true market value? The current
version of the statute provides no guidance. "As a general rule the price brought at a
public sale, after proper and lawful advertisement, is prima facie the market value of the
property." Peachtree Mortg. Corp. v. First Nat'l Bank, 143 Ga. App. 17, 18, 237 S.E.2d
416, 418 (1977) (quoting Thompson v. Maslia, 127 Ga. App. 758, 764, 195 S.E.2d 238, 243
(1972)). Lenders and borrowers therefore typically present competing appraisals of the
property as evidence of true market value. Although courts accept such expert appraisals
as evidence of true market value, appraisals of real estate value are far from a precise
science. Id.; see also La Ronde, Ltd. v. Amsouth Bank of Fla., 203 Ga. App. 400, 416 S.E.2d
881 (1992).
Substituting an appraiser's opinion as to reasonably equivalent value merely
results in the court looking to find what an imaginary buyer will pay an imaginary
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particular, the statute does not state whether guarantors are protected
under the statute."

seller under unreal conditions, rather than finding what a real buyer and seller
do in real circumstances. While being as "well informed as possible," an
appraiser's opinion of value is, after all, merely a guess.
Alan S. Gover & Glenn D. West, The Texas NonjudicialForeclosureProcess-A Proposal
to Reconcile the Procedures Mandated by State Law sith the Fraudulent Conveyance
Principlesof the Bankruptcy Code, 43 Sw. L.J. 1061, 1080 (1990).
Therefore, an appraisal purportedly evidencing the "true market value" of property will
vary based on a particular appraiser's chosen method of calculation and analysis, and is
essentially nothing more than a "guess" of the property's value. The three dominant
appraisal methods typically used to determine the market value of commercial real estate
are: "(1) the cost approach, (2) the sales comparison approach, and (3) the income
capitalization approach." Marsh, supra note 11, at 358. Each of these appraisal methods
uses different techniques and methods and therefore "normally arrive at different estimates
of market value." Id.
Because the confirmation statute "does not preclude any specific method of property
appraisal," both the lender and borrower submit their respective appraisals to the court
with the hope that the presiding judge will find their appraiser's guess to be more reflective
of "true market value" than the other. See Boring v. State Bank & Trust Co., 307 Ga. App.
93, 97, 704 S.E.2d 207, 210 (2010). For example, in River Forest,Inc. v. United Bank, 320
Ga. App. 115, 739 S.E.2d 403 (2013), the lender submitted an appraisal valuing the
property at $105,000, while the borrower submitted a competing appraisal valuing the
property at $265,000. Id. at 118-19, 739 S.E.2d at 406. Both appraisers utilized the sales
comparison approach, but the lender's appraiser discounted the initial retail value
determination of $255,000 to $105,000 after applying a discount cash-flow method to
account for depressed market conditions. Id. In some cases, the judge finds the lender's
appraisal to be reflective of true market value. See id. at 119, 739 S.E.2d at 407. In other
cases, although the lender relied in good faith on its appraiser's opinion as to value, the
judge finds that the appraisal is faulty and will deny confirmation. This occurred in
Gutherie v. Ford Equipment Leasing Co., 206 Ga. App. 258, 424 S.E.2d 889 (1992), when
the Georgia Court of Appeals reversed confirmation because the trial court inappropriately
relied on the "quick sale" value of the property. Id. at 261, 424 S.E.2d at 892. The court
of appeals held that such valuation "[did] not reflect the price that would be obtained in
a sale under the usual market conditions." Id. The court found that the statute, in using
the terms "true market value," could not be "construed to mean 'market value under quick
sale conditions.'" Id. Moreover, an appellate court will generally defer to the trial court's
determination as to which appraisal was more reflective of true market value: So long as
"the appraiser's opinion was not based on sheer speculation, [the appellate court] will not
second guess any methodology utilized to reach the opinion." Mundy Mill Dev., LLC v.
ACR Prop. Servs., LP, 306 Ga. App. 730, 734, 703 S.E.2d 137, 140 (2010) (quoting REL &
Assocs., 304 Ga. App. at 35, 695 S.E.2d at 372).
53. See O.C.G.A. § 44-14-161(c) (requiring notice to the "debtor").
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B. Extending Protection to Guarantors:First National Bank & Rust
Co. v. Kunes
The seminal case extending protection to guarantors is FirstNational
Bank & Rust Co. v. Kunes," when the Georgia Court of Appeals
allowed a commercial guarantor to escape his contractual obligations
based on deficient notice." The confirmation statute requires the court
to "direct that a notice of the hearing . .. be given to the debtor at least
five days prior thereto."" Contrary to the strict construction purportedly required by the statute, however, in Kunes the Georgia Court of
Appeals broadly interpreted the undefined, ambiguous term "debtor"
against the lender by extending the term to include guarantors."
In Kunes, the lender applied for confirmation of a foreclosure sale in
the appropriate court and named the corporate-borrower as the sole
defendant. The Superior Court of Tift County directed notice of the
proceedings to the corporate-borrower in accordance with the confirmation statute and subsequently confirmed the sale." With confirmation
of the sale in hand, the lender instituted a deficiency action against the
corporate-borrower and the two guarantors of the loan (who were also
officers of the corporate-borrower). All three defendants filed a motion
to dismiss, arguing that the guarantors failed to receive notice of the
confirmation proceedings. The court granted the motion to dismiss, and
the lender appealed."
On appeal, the lender argued that the guarantors were not "debtors"
entitled to notice under the terms of the confirmation statute.o The
court of appeals rejected this argument and concluded that the term
"included all who were presently subject to payment of the debt, or who
might be subjected to payment thereof."61 Further, the court noted that
"[i]t would only be under the principle of reductio ad absurdum to say
the General Assembly wished to protect the principal debtor from double

54. 128 Ga. App. 565, 197 S.E.2d 446, affd, 230 Ga. 888, 199 S.E.2d 776 (1973).
55. Id. at 569, 197 S.E.2d at 449.
56. O.C.G.A. § 44-14-161(c).
57. Kunes, 128 Ga. App. at 567-69, 197 S.E.2d at 448-49; compare Bentley, 170 Ga. App.
at 362, 317 S.E.2d at 339 ("The judge himself, not the clerk of court, is the one to whose
attention the report of sale and its particulars must be brought.") with Kunes, 128 Ga. App.
at 568, 197 S.E.2d at 448 ('"The statute, by using the word 'debtor,' included all who were
presently subject to payment of the debt, or who might be subjected to payment thereof,
if within the knowledge of the payee of the note.").
58. Kunes, 128 Ga. App. at 565-66, 197 S.E.2d at 447.
59. Id. at 565-66, 197 S.E.2d at 447-48.
60. Id. at 567, 197 S.E.2d at 448.
61. Id. at 568, 197 S.E.2d at 448.
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payment, but did not have any concern whatever for endorsers and
guarantors."6 2 Interestingly, the court did not reference any legislative
history of the statute to reach this conclusion but rather turned to the
language of a different court of appeals opinion to "reinforce []" its
interpretation.6
Under the holding in Kunes, a lender cannot pursue a deficiency
judgment against the guarantor if the guarantor does not receive proper
notice of the confirmation proceedings.'
Notably, in contrast to the
court's theory of legislative intent, a prior version of the confirmation
statute included more specific terms with regard to the required
recipients of notice; notice of the hearing was to be given to the
"mortgagor, grantor, their heirs, legal representatives, successors or
assignees of grantor or mortgagor."
Although this language was
consolidated to the single term "debtor" in the final version of the
statute, which was approved and enacted just twenty-two days after this
prior version was proposed," the legislature's exclusion of guarantors
in its list is notable. Arguably, based on this exclusion, the legislature,
when using the term "debtor" in the enacted version of the statute, did
not intend for a "debtor" to include guarantors."
Although the holding in Kunes was based on the statute's notice
requirement, other courts have broadly applied the holding to mean that
"guarantors and sureties enjoy the protection of the confirmation
statute."' Therefore, a failure to obtain confirmation, for whatever
reason, not only bars a lender's recovery from the principal borrower, but
also bars any recovery from a guarantor of the loan."

62. Id. at 567-68, 197 S.E.2d at 448 (emphasis omitted).
63. Id. at 567, 197 S.E.2d at 448 (citing Goodman v. Nadler, 113 Ga. App. 493,496, 148
S.E.2d 480, 483 (1966)). In Goodman, however, the Georgia Court of Appeals did not refer
to legislative intent, but only noted that the "strongest ground of public policy" in enforcing
the confirmation statute was to protect the debtor from double payment. Goodman, 113
Ga. App. at 496, 148 S.E.2d at 483.
64. See Kunes, 128 Ga. App. at 569, 197 S.E.2d at 449.
65. 1935 GA. H. JOURNAL 1759.
66. Id. The Georgia House of Representatives proposed this version on March 6, 1935,
and the statute was enacted on March 28, 1935. Id.
67. Under the interpretive canon of expressio unius est exclusio alterius, "when the
legislature includes some circumstances explicitly, then the legislature intentionally
omitted other similar circumstances that would logically have been included. In other
words, the canon presumes that the legislature considered and rejected every related
possibility." LINDA D. JELLUM, MASTERING STATUTORY INTERPRETATION 111 (2008).
68. Redman Indus., Inc. v. Tower Props., Inc., 517 F. Supp. 144, 150 (N.D. Ga. 1981).
69. See, e.g., Chastain Place, Inc. v. Bank S., N.A., 185 Ga. App. 178, 180, 363 S.E.2d
616, 617 (1987).
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Examining GuarantorLiability Under the ConfirmationStatute

Arguably, the confirmation statute does not protect the guarantor, but
courts, based on the holding in Kunes, have improperly applied the
statute to allow guarantors to escape their contractual obligations. The
confirmation statute simply states that "no action may be taken to
obtain a deficiency judgment" unless the lender first obtains judicial
confirmation.70 Because "deficiency judgment" is not defined in the
statute, courts interpreting the confirmation statute have had difficulty
in defining what actions constitute a deficiency judgment, which is
barred if a lender fails to obtain confirmation.
For example, the United States District Court for the Middle District
of Georgia held that the confirmation statute "applies to both primary
debtors and guarantors; an action for the balance remaining on a note
following a foreclosure sale against a guarantor rather than the primary
debtor is still an action for a deficiency judgment under the statute and
is barred if no confirmation was obtained. 72 Similarly, another court,
citing to Kunes, concluded that "it would not matter for purposes of [the
confirmation] statute whether the debtors were primarily or secondarily
liable on the debt as they would still have to be notified of the confirmation proceedings to be held accountable for the deficiency, or balance due
on the indebtedness."" Therefore, "deficiency judgment" has been
equated to the "balance due on the indebtedness" regardless of whether
the obligations to pay that balance were separate and independent.7 "
Under this line of reasoning, it is a "commonsensical view that a
deficiency judgment is one for the balance due on an indebtedness and
that a statute aimed at providing debtor relief. . . did not discriminate
among debtors." In contrast, the United States Court of Appeals for
the Seventh Circuit, interpreting Georgia's confirmation statute, held
that a lender's action against the guarantor was not a deficiency
judgment, but instead a "suit ... on the guaranty, not on the confirmation; and in that suit the value of the land, as distinct from what [the
lender] paid for it, is irrelevant."0

70. O.C.G.A. § 44-14-161(a).
71. See e.g., United States v. Yates, 774 F. Supp. 1368, 1372 (M.D. Ga. 1991).
72. Id.
73. United States v. Dismuke, 616 F.2d 755, 758 (5th Cir. 1980) (quoting Kunes, 230
Ga. at 890, 199 S.E.2d at 778).
74. Id.
75. Id.
76. Inland Mortg. Capital Corp. v. Chivas Retail Partners, LLC, 740 F.3d 1146, 1150
(7th Cir. 2014).
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Arguably, the Seventh Circuit's interpretation is correct, and an action
against a guarantor should not be construed as a deficiency judgment
under the terms of the confirmation statute. Although courts have
broadly defined "deficiency judgment" and included other contractual
obligations in their definitions, these other obligations were always
secured by the same property that was sold in the foreclosure sale."
For example, in Iwan Renovations, Inc. v. North Atlanta National
Bank," the Georgia Court of Appeals noted that "[a] deficiency
judgment is the imposition of personal liability on mortgagorfor unpaid
balance of mortgage debt after foreclosure has failed to yield [the] full
amount of due debt."7 1 Under this definition, an action against the
mortgagorof the property to recover a separate "debtl] that [is] incurred
for the same purpose, secured by the same property, held by the same
creditor and owed by the same debtor" constitutes an action to obtain a
deficiency judgment.ao
In Bank of North Georgia v. Windermere Development, Inc.," the
Georgia Court of Appeals defined "deficiency judgment" as including a
lender's suit for reimbursement from a borrower." In Windermere
Development, the borrower, a commercial real-estate development
company, had its sights on investing in the development of a residential
subdivision."
To facilitate the venture, the borrower obtained a
commercial loan from the lender and executed a promissory note, which
was secured by a deed to secure debt. The borrower also obtained four
letters of credit from the same lender, which named the Douglas County
Board of Commissioners as the beneficiary. The borrower simultaneously executed reimbursement agreements in favor of the lender and
secured their reimbursement obligations with the same property used to
secure the promissory note."
When the borrowers defaulted on their obligations to the lender, the
lender foreclosed upon and sold the encumbered property at public
auction but did not pursue judicial confirmation of the sale. After
foreclosure, the Board of Commissioners demanded payment from the

77. See, e.g., Iwan Renovations, Inc. v. N. Atlanta Nat'l Bank, 296 Ga. App. 125, 127,
673 S.E.2d 632, 634 (2009).
78. 296 Ga. App. 125, 673 S.E.2d 632 (2009).
79. Id. at 127,673 S.E.2d at 634-35 (emphasis added) (quoting C.K.C., Inc. v. Free, 196
Ga. App. 280, 282, 395 S.E.2d 666, 667 (1990)).
80. Oakvale Rd. Assocs., Ltd. v. Mortg. Recovery Fund-Atlanta Pools, L.P., 231 Ga.
App. 414, 416, 499 S.E.2d 404, 406 (1998).
81. 316 Ga. App. 33, 728 S.E.2d 714 (2012).
82. Id. at 39, 728 S.E.2d at 718.
83. Id. at 34, 728 S.E.2d at 715.
84. Id. at 34-36, 728 S.E.2d at 715-16.
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lender on all four letters of credit, and the lender honored its contractual
obligations by making payment to the Board. Pursuant to the reimbursement agreements, the lender subsequently sued the borrower for
reimbursement of the payments made to the Board.'
The court of appeals held that the lender's suits for reimbursement
"must be considered suits to recover deficiency judgments" because "the
debts were incurred for the same purpose, secured by the same property,
held by the same creditor, and owed by the same debtor, they were
inextricably intertwined." The court noted that including inextricably
intertwined debts within the definition of a deficiency judgment
"prevent[s] creditors from circumventing the [confirmation] statute's
mandates by making successive loans against the security of the same
property."" Although the suits for reimbursement were separate
obligations, those obligations were secured by the same property that
was foreclosed upon and therefore fell within the scope of the confirmation statute's protection."
In contrast to these contractual obligations that are secured by the
same property, guaranty agreements (assuming that they are not
similarly secured) are completely independent and separate contracts.89
Under Georgia law, a guaranty agreement is a contract whereby "a
person obligates himself to pay the debt of another in consideration of
a benefit flowing to the surety or in consideration of credit . .. given to
his principal."o Further, the contract of guaranty creates an obligation
"which is separate and distinct from that of the principal debtor, and
where [the guarantor] renders himself secondarily or collaterally liable
on account of any inability of the principal to perform his own contract."9 ' Georgia has historically emphasized the importance of

85. Id. at 36-37, 728 S.E.2d at 716-17.
86. Id. at 39, 728 S.E.2d at 718.
87. Id. at 38, 728 S.E.2d at 718 (quoting Iwan Renovations, Inc., 296 Ga. App. at 128,
673 S.E.2d at 635).
88. See id.
89. Compare Iwan Renovations, Inc., 296 Ga. App. at 129, 673 S.E.2d at 636 (noting
that the lender's action was "not to recover on an independent, separate, unsecured
obligation.") with William Goldberg & Co. v. Cohen, 219 Ga. App. 628,638,466 S.E.2d 872,
882 (1995) ("A guaranty is a contract separate and distinct from the obligation it
guarantees.").
90. O.C.G.A. § 10-7-1 (2009). Although Georgia law previously distinguished a
guaranty from a suretyship, this distinction has since been abolished by statute. Id.
("There shall be no distinction between contracts of suretyship and guaranty."). For
purposes of this Comment, a guaranty and surety will be used interchangeably.
91. Etheridge v. Rawleigh Co., 29 Ga. App. 698, 702, 116 S.E. 903, 905 (1923).
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9
In
freedom of contract in the exercise of purely contractual rights."
fact, such contractual rights are the underlying rationale of the lender's
right to conduct a non-judicial foreclosure sale, as such a procedure
results from a "purely contractual matter between two parties in the
exercise of private property rights."93 If courts were regularly to
interfere with the exercise of such contractual rights, the Georgia
Supreme Court has noted that the "wheels of trade and commerce would
grind to a halt and already congested court dockets would become
completely unmanageable."" The Georgia legislature, recognizing the
importance of freedom of contract, decided that judicial supervision of a
foreclosure and subsequent sale was unnecessary (excepting, of course,
the confirmation requirement)."
In contrast to Georgia's application of the confirmation statute to
guarantors, other states explicitly deny guarantors any protection under
anti-deficiency legislation." For example, the North Dakota Supreme
Court in Alerus Financial,N.A. v. Marcil Group Inc.,9" held that North
Dakota's anti-deficiency statute did not apply to guarantors.98 The
court noted that "a guarantor's liability is premised on a separate and
distinct contract of guaranty rather than on any obligations imposed by
the notes and mortgages subject to a foreclosure action."99 Further,
North Dakota's anti-deficiency statute, like Georgia's confirmation
statute, does not clearly include guarantors within the scope of the

92. E.g., Coffey Enters. Realty & Dev. Co. v. Holmes, 233 Ga. 937,938,213 S.E.2d 882,
884 (1975).
93. Id.
94. Id. at 938-39, 213 S.E.2d at 884 ("It would be an insult to the public intelligence to
require the government, through its courts, to become involved in all private affairs and
require court approval for the exercise of rights under a private contract involving
consenting adults as if they were minors or lunatics. Of course, the courts are always open
to an aggrieved party to correct an injustice caused by fraud.").
95. See id. at 945, 213 S.E.2d at 888 (Gunter, J., concurring specially). The authority
to conduct a non-judicial foreclosure sale can also be contained in a mortgage or other lien
contract, but this Comment will focus on the authority under a deed to secure debt. This
"sale under power" is permitted without the supervision or approval of the court, and is
consequently referred to as a non-judicial foreclosure sale. See id, at 938, 213 S.E.2d at
884.
96. See, e.g., Talbott v. Hustwit, 78 Cal. Rptr. 3d 703, 706 (Cal. Ct. App. 2008) ("[Clase
law is uniform in holding [that the anti-deficiency statute] does not apply to guarantors
. . . ."); First Nat'l Bank & Trust Co. of Williston v. Anseth, 503 N.W.2d 568, 572 (N.D.
1993) (quoting Bank of Kirkwood Plaza v. Mueller, 294 N.W.2d 640, 643 (N.D. 1980)) ("[It
is not clear that guarantors were also meant to be covered. We will not extend the scope
of the anti-deficiency statutes beyond that which is clear from the statute.").
97. 806 N.W.2d 160 (N.D. 2011).
98. Id. at 167.
99. Id. (citing Anseth, 503 N.W.2d at 572-73).
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statute.100 However, in contrast to Georgia courts, North Dakota
courts refuse to "extend the scope of the anti-deficiency statutes beyond
that which is clear from the statute."'0 ' In fact, "a majority of state
courts considering the issue [of guarantor protection] have declined to
expand the coverage of the [anti-deficiency] statute to those not covered
by the statute."'02 These courts have determined that "the liability of
the guarantor [ derives wholly from the guaranty agreement," and such
liability should remain unaffected by application of the anti-deficiency
statute.103

Although Georgia courts have construed the confirmation statute to
apply to guarantors, they have also recognized that "[t]he failure to
obtain confirmation of a sale does not operate to extinguish the
remaining debt; rather, it simply precludes the person exercising the
power of sale from instituting suit to obtain a deficiency judgment."' 0
Further, courts have stated that a failure to obtain confirmation "simply
renders it impossible for the holder to sue on it, just as would a
discharge in bankruptcy of the maker."1o' Notably, "[a] discharge in
bankruptcy does not extinguish the debt itself[j but merely releases the
debtor from personal liability for the debt."c Under bankruptcy, the
debtor's personal liability is extinguished but "the debt still exists and
can be collected from any other entity that might be liable," which
includes a guarantor.' 7 In contrast, Georgia's current application of
the confirmation statute to a guarantor invalidates the guarantor's
contractual obligations to the lender.

100. See id.
101. Id. (quoting Mueller, 294 N.W.2d at 643).
102. First Sec. Bank of Idaho, N.A. v. Gaige, 765 P.2d 683, 685-86 (Idaho 1988).
103. Mueller, 294 N.W.2d at 643-44.
104. Worth v. First Nat'l Bank of Alma, 175 Ga. App. 297, 298, 333 S.E.2d 173, 174
(1985); see also Turpin v. N. Am. Acceptance Corp., 119 Ga. App. 212, 217, 166 S.E.2d 588,
592 (1969); Powers v. Wren, 198 Ga. 316, 321, 31 S.E.2d 713, 716 (1944).
105. Turpin, 119 Ga. App. at 217; see also Taylor, 158 Ga. App. at 672, 282 S.E.2d at
158-59; Powers, 198 Ga. at 321, 31 S.E.2d at 716; Marler v. Rockmart Bank, 146 Ga. App.
548, 549, 246 S.E.2d 731, 733 (1978).
106. In re Hayden, 477 B.R. 260, 264 (Bankr. N.D. Ga. 2012) (quoting Houston v.
Edgeworth (In re Edgeworth), 993 F.2d 51, 53 (5th Cir. 1993)).
107. Id. at 264 (quoting In re Edgeworth, 993 F.2d at 53).
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A guaranty agreement is utilized as a "traditional method of protecting a bank's capital investment.""o' Under Georgia law, a "contract of
guaranty or suretyship is primarily one to pay the debt of another which
may be due and payable by the principal debtor to the creditor upon
default."o' A guarantor therefore "obligates himself to pay the debt of
another in consideration of a benefit flowing to the surety or in
consideration of credit ... given to his principal."no In other words,
when executing a guaranty, the guarantor promises the lender that he
will pay if the principal borrower is unable to do so. The enforceability
of this promise is an important concern for lenders, as the lender views
the guaranty as "an effective means to lessen a bank's risk when a loan
becomes unrecoverable from a borrower,""' as the guarantor "renders
himself secondarily or collaterally liable on account of any inability of
the principal to perform his own contract.""12
Simply put, a guaranty agreement is a contract and is to be interpreted as such."' Under traditional contract principles, when interpreting
a contract of guaranty, a court must first "decide if the language is clear
and unambiguous, and, if it is, no construction is required.""' Therefore, if "the language of the contract is plain, unambiguous, and capable
of only one reasonable interpretation, no other construction is permissible.""15
Of course, "lals with any contract, a party to an agreement may
attempt to evade the reasonably incurred obligation, if the contract has
become economically or otherwise unfavorable to the evading party," and
will "challenge every aspect of the loan documentation in the hope of
finding some deficiency that will release them from their obligations

108. Raymer McQuiston, Drafting an Enforceable Guaranty in an International
FinancingTransaction:A Lender'sPerspective, 10 INT'L TAX & Bus. LAW. 138, 139 (1993).
109. Roswell Festival, LLLP v. Athens Int'l, Inc., 259 Ga. App. 445, 448, 576 S.E.2d
908, 911 (2003).

110.
111.
112.
113.

O.C.G.A. § 10-7-1.
McQuiston, supra note 108, at 138.
Etheridge, 29 Ga. App. at 702, 116 S.E. at 905.
See Citrus Tower Blvd. Imaging Ctr., LLC v. Owens, 325 Ga. App. 1, 11, 752

S.E.2d 74, 79 (2013).

114. Id. at 14, 752 S.E.2d at 81.
115. Highwoods Realty L.P. v. Cmty. Loans of Am., Inc., 288 Ga. App. 226, 229, 653
S.E.2d 807, 809 (2007) (quoting Barranco v. Welcome Years, Inc., 260 Ga. App. 456, 460,
579 S.E.2d. 866, 870 (2003)).
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under the guaranty."116 On the other hand, the lender simply wants
what it bargained for-namely, the enforcement of the guarantor's
promise that induced the lender to make the loan in the first place."
To curtail a guarantor's attempts to discharge his contractual promise
to the lender, typical commercial guaranty agreements include a broad
waiver provision, which is arguably the "lender's paramount protective
clause."1 ' The waiver provision provides the lender with the assurance that someone will pay the debt, regardless of the lender's ability to
Until recently, no Georgia
recover from the principal borrower.'
court had explicitly addressed the enforceability of a guarantor's waiver
of the protection otherwise afforded to him by the confirmation
statute.120
HWA Properties,Inc. v. Community & Southern Bank
In July 2013, the Georgia Court of Appeals held that a guarantor's
waiver of protection was enforceable.12 ' In HWA Properties, Inc.,122
the court of appeals, focusing on the guarantor's contractual waiver,
upheld a lender's right to pursue a deficiency judgment against a
guarantor without confirmation of sale.2 a The specific procedural
history of the case is not essential to this analysis. 124 Essentially, the
court had to determine whether the lender's failure to confirm a nonjudicial foreclosure sale invalidated the obligations of the principal
borrower and the guarantor.'" Based on the lender's failure to have
A.

116. McQuiston, supra note 108, at 139.
117. Id.
118. Id. at 157.
119. See id.
120. See generally IIWA Props, Inc. 322 Ga. App. at 887, 746 S.E.2d at 617.
121. See id.
122. Id. at 877, 746 S.E.2d at 609.
123. Id. at 887-88, 746 S.E.2d at 617.
124. That history is as follows: In June 2008, Community & Southern Bank (the Bank)
extended a loan to HWA Properties (HWA) for approximately $4 million. The promissory
note was secured by real property, as well as a contemporaneous, unconditional, personal
guaranty executed by Harry Albright. Upon HWA's default, the Bank sued HWA and Mr.
Albright on the promissory note and guaranty respectively for $2,683,534. While those
suits were pending, the Bank sold the encumbered property for $1.59 million in a nonjudicial foreclosure sale, leaving a deficiency of $1,093,534. The Bank obtained judicial
confirmation of the sale, which HWA and Albright appealed. Id. at 878-80, 746 S.E.2d at
611-12.
125. Id. at 884, 746 S.E.2d at 615. While the confirmation appeal was pending, the
Bank moved for summary judgment against both HWA and Albright for the deficiency.
The Superior Court of Fulton County granted summary judgment against both parties,
noting that Albright was liable alongside HWA as a result of his unconditional personal
guaranty of the note. HWA and Albright appealed the grant of summary judgment. While
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the sale validly confirmed, the court of appeals held that the lender
could not pursue a deficiency judgment against the principal borrower.126 The court, however, held that the lender's failure did not affect
the guarantor's liability.'w
Notably, the court also held that the lender's "failure to obtain a valid
confirmation of the foreclosure sale, pursuant to the confirmation
statute, does not impair its authority to collect the difference between
the amount due on the note and the foreclosure sale proceeds from [the
guarantor] based upon his personal guaranty."' 28 Therefore, the lender
was permitted to proceed against the guarantor because the guarantor's
"liability on the note [was] based upon his unconditional personal
guaranty."'" In so holding, the court paid particular attention to the
provisions contained in the unconditional guaranty.'
B.

Examining the Guaranty

The guaranty agreement at issue in HWA Properties stated: "No act
or thing need occur to establish the liability of [the guarantor], and no
act or thing, except full payment and discharge of all indebtedness, shall
in any way exonerate [the guarantor] or modify, reduce, limit or release
the liability of [the guarantor] ...

'

In other words, the guarantor

promised the lender that he would remain liable for the debt until the
lender received full payment of the outstanding debt. This type of
promise is sometimes called a "hell-or-high-water guaranty," because the
guarantor promises the lender that "the guarantor will pay all the
obligations of the debtor, no matter how or when they arise, and without
conditions."' 32
The guaranty further stated:
(The guarantor] expressly agrees that [he] shall be and remain liable,
to the fullest extent permitted by applicable law, for any deficiency
remainingafter foreclosure ofany mortgageor security interest securing
[the indebtedness], whether or not the liability of [the principal

the summary judgment appeal was pending, the court of appeals reversed the order of
confirmation. Given the reversal of confirmation, both HWA and Albright argued that
summary judgment for the deficiency should be reversed. Id. at 879, 880, 746 S.E.2d at
612.
126. Id. at 884, 746 S.E.2d at 615.
127. Id. at 888, 746 S.E.2d at 617.
128. Id. at 887-88, 746 S.E.2d at 617.
129. Id. at 885, 746 S.E.2d at 616.
130. See generally id. at 885-87, 746 S.E.2d at 616-17.
131. Id. at 885, 746 S.E.2d at 616 (emphasis omitted).
132. Rick L. Knuth, The Commercial Loan Guaranty-Types & Techniques, 21 UTAH
B.J. 14, 17 (2008).
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borrower] or any other obligor for such deficiency is discharged
pursuant to statute or judicial decision. [The guarantor] shall remain

obligated, to the fullest extent permitted by law, to pay such amounts
as though the [principal borrower's] obligations had not been discharged. 133

Therefore, the guarantor promised the lender that he would remain
liable for any deficiency, regardless of whether the principal borrower's
liability was extinguished pursuant to "statute or judicial decision."134
The confirmation statute can certainly act to extinguish the principal
borrower's liability if a lender fails to confirm the sale." ' The court,
noting that "the guaranty specifically provide[d] that [the guarantor]
shall remain liable for any deficiency remaining after the foreclosure of
any property securing the note" regardless of the borrower's discharge
by statute, held that the lender's failure to confirm the sale did not affect
the guarantor's liability. 36
The court therefore upheld the enforceability of the guarantor's waiver
of the protection otherwise afforded to him under the confirmation
statute.' 7 Georgia law permits a guarantor to "waive or renounce
what the law has established in his favor when he does not thereby
injure others or affect the public interest."3 3 By waiving protection of
the confirmation statute, a guarantor can hardly be said to injure others
by doing so. Further, such a waiver generally does not violate public
policy. For example, California courts have "recognized that the
protections afforded to debtors under the antideficiency legislation do not
directly protect guarantors from liability for deficiency judgments."3
Although the debtor, or principal borrower, is not permitted to waive
protection of California's anti-deficiency legislation, "if a guarantor
expressly waives the protections of the antideficiency laws, a lender may
recover the deficiency judgment against the guarantor even though the
antideficiency laws would bar the lender from collecting that same
deficiency from the primary obligor."'"
Although "antideficiency
legislation was established for a public reason and cannot be contravened by a private agreement" by the principal borrower, no such public

133. HWA Properties,Inc., 322 Ga. App. at 886-87, 746 S.E.2d at 617 (second alteration
in original) (emphasis omitted).
134. Id. (emphasis omitted).
135. See, e.g., Ward v. Pembroke State Bank, 212 Ga. App. 322, 323, 441 S.E.2d 691,
692 (1994); C.KC., Inc., 196 Ga. App. at 282, 395 S.E.2d at 667.
136. HWA Properties,Inc., 322 Ga. App. at 887-88, 746 S.E.2d at 617.
137. See id.
138. O.C.G.A. § 1-3-7 (2000).
139. Cadle Co. II v. Harvey, 100 Cal. Rptr. 2d 150, 154 (Cal. CL App. 2000).
140. Id.
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reason exists to prevent a guarantor from waiving protection. 14 1
Similarly, a guarantor's waiver of protection under the Texas antideficiency statute has been held not to violate the public policy of
Texas. 142 Although Texas courts recognize that the purpose of the
state's anti-deficiency statute was "to prevent mortgagees from
recovering more than their due at the guarantor's expense," this purpose
"does not necessarily translate into a policy so fundamental to Texas
jurisprudence that it cannot be waived contractually."'
Therefore, it
appears that under Georgia law, like California and Texas, a guarantor's
waiver of protection under the confirmation statute is permitted.'4
Further, Georgia law permits a guarantor to "consent in advance to a
course of conduct which would otherwise result in his discharge." 45
For example, a guarantor may waive in advance a novationl 46 or an
increase in risk,14 1 which would otherwise result in the guarantor's
discharge. 4 1 So long as the waiver provisions in the guaranty are
clear and unambiguous, the court's role is to apply the provisions of the
guaranty as written. 4 1 Therefore, a guaranty containing a waiver of
protection under the confirmation statute, so long as it is "plain,
unambiguous, and capable of only one reasonable interpretation," should
be enforced against the guarantor.5 o
C.

Inland Mortgage Capital Corp. v. Chivas Retail Partners,LLC
Although HWA Propertieswas the first occasion for a Georgia court to
address explicitly the enforceability of a guaranty agreement in the

141. See id.
142. Segal v. Emmes Capital, L.L.C., 155 S.W.3d 267, 278 (Tex. App. 2004).
143. Id.
144. See O.C.G.A. § 1-3-7.
145. Bobbitt v. Firestone Tire & Rubber Co., 158 Ga. App. 580,581-82,281 S.E.2d 324,
325 (1981) (quoting Dunlap v. Citizens & S. DeKalb Bank, 134 Ga. App. 893, 896, 216
S.E.2d 651, 653 (1975)).
146. See Staten v. Beaulieu Grp., LLC, 278 Ga. App. 179, 180, 628 S.E.2d 614, 615
(2006) (citing O.C.G.A. § 10-7-21 (2009)).
147. See Builders Dev. Corp. v. Hughes Supply, Inc., 242 Ga. App. 244,245,529 S.E.2d
388, 389 (2000) (citing O.C.G.A. § 10-7-22 (2009)).
148. See Wooden v. Synovus Bank, 323 Ga. App. 794, 796, 748 S.E.2d 275, 277 (2013)
quoting Underwood v. Nationsbanc Real Estate Serv., Inc., 221 Ga. App. 351, 353, 471
S.E.2d 291, 293 (1996)) ("A guarantor can consent to a novation, and such 'consent can be
given in advance, even at the time the guaranty is signed.'"); see also BuildersDev. Corp.,
242 Ga. App. at 245, 529 S.E.2d at 389 ("The guarantor's liability is not extinguished where
the change is done with his knowledge and consent.").
149. Core LaVista, LLC v. Cumming, 308 Ga. App. 791, 794, 709 S.E.2d 336, 340
(2011).
150. Id. at 795, 709 S.E.2d at 340.
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context of confirmation, it was not the first court to apply Georgia law

to that question. In Inland Mortgage Capital Corp. v. Chivas Retail

Partners, LLC,'5 s the United States District Court for the Northern
District of Illinois, interpreting Georgia's confirmation statute, reached
a similar decision with regard to the enforceability of a guaranty
Inland Mortgage Capital Corporation (the Lender)
agreement."
extended a commercial loan to Harbins Crossing (Harbins) in the
amount of $59,670,000 to build a retail shopping center in metro
Atlanta. The Lender failed to obtain confirmation of the non-judicial
foreclosure sale in any Georgia superior court and therefore was
precluded from pursuing a deficiency judgment against Harbins, the
principal borrower. Instead, the Lender brought suit against the
guarantors for breach of their respective guaranty agreements.153 The
court rejected the guarantors' argument that the failure to obtain
confirmation "erased the deficiency" or otherwise precluded the Lender
By looking at the language of the
from recovering against them."
confirmation statute, the court held that a Georgia court's refusal to
grant confirmation did not equate to a finding that a deficiency did not
exist.155 The court noted that the only conclusion to draw from a
denial of confirmation was a judicial holding that "the sale was not
properly conducted."'
Alternatively, the guarantors argued that, even if the failure to obtain
confirmation only extinguished Harbins's liability as to the deficiency,
the guarantors' liability was also extinguished because "if there's no
underlying debt there's nothing to guarantee."15 ' Although the district
court noted that Illinois law applied when interpreting the effect of the
guaranty agreement, the guarantors did not point to any Illinois or
Georgia law that barred a waiver of the confirmation requirement or a

151. 884 F. Supp. 2d 702 (N.D. Ill. 2012). Choice of law principles requires the guaranty
agreement to be construed under Illinois law, and the confirmation proceeding to be
construed under Georgia law. Id. at 704.
152. See id. at 707.
153. Id. at 703-04.
154. Id. at 704, 705.
155. Id. at 705 ("There is no finding that a deficiency does not exist or that [the Lender]
can't pursue one.").
156. Id.
157. Id. at 706. Relying on Gilbert v. Arneson, 142 Ga. App. 205, 235 S.E.2d 647
(1977), the court rejected the guarantor's argument. Inland Mortg. Capital Corp., 884 F.
Supp. 2d at 706. Gilbert states: "The obligation of the surety is accessory to that of his
principal, and if the latter from any cause becomes extinct, the former shall cease. . . ." 142
Ga. App. at 206, 235 S.E.2d at 648.
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waiver of the general rule that the guarantor's obligation be contingent
on the borrower's obligation."'8
In the guaranty agreement, the guarantors expressly agreed to pay
any deficiency, even if the Lender lost its right to collect the deficiency
from Harbins, the principal borrower.1 59 The language of this waiver
provision stated: "[Tihe Guarantor hereby waives any defense to the
recovery by Lender ...

against the Guarantor of any deficiency after

such action, notwithstanding any impairment or loss of any right of
deficiency or other right or remedy against ...

[Harbins].""' This

contractual waiver kept intact the guarantors' obligations to the Lender,
regardless of any effect the confirmation proceeding had on Harbins's
liability for the deficiency.'' Essentially, the court, like the court in
HWA Properties, determined that the guarantors had contractually
agreed that their obligations under the guaranty were independent from
the principal borrower's liability, noting that the guarantors "deliberately placed themselves on the hook whether or not [the Lender] could
collect from Harbins-that was their bargain in reliance on which [the
Lender] paid out nearly $60 million." 6 1
Like the analysis in HWA Properties,the court's analysis in Inland is
consistent with Georgia law. As the court in Inland noted, Georgia law
does not bar a guarantor from waiving protection under the confirmation
statute.163 If aclompetent parties are free to choose, insert, and agree
to whatever provisions they desire in a contract unless prohibited by
statute or public policy," a guarantor, assuming that he is a competent
party, should be permitted to waive protection of the confirmation
statute. 16
IV.

LEGISLATIVE PROPOSALS

As noted previously, it is evident that guarantors are increasingly
"rely[ing] on technical [procedural] arguments to overturn a confirmation
in which they fully participated," thereby preventing the lender from
being made whole.'65 To "enhance the probability of the lender being

158. Inland Mortg. Capital Corp., 884 F. Supp. 2d at 707.
159. Id. at 706.
160. Id. (first and last alterations in original) (citations omitted).
161. Id.
162. Id.
163. See id. at 707.
164. Core LaVista, LLC, 308 Ga. App. at 795, 709 S.E.2d at 341 (alteration in original)
(quoting Brookside Cmtys., LLC v. Lake Dow N. Corp., 268 Ga. App. 785, 786, 603 S.E.2d
31, 33 (2004)).
165. Quattlebaum, 269 Ga. at 860, 505 S.E.2d at 479 (Fletcher, J., dissenting).
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made whole" and prevent "reluctant guarantors [from] attempt[ing] to
extricate themselves from their third-party obligations," the legislature
could consider the following suggested solutions.166
Commercial Real Estate v. Residential Real Estate Guarantors
First, the decision of HWA Propertiesshould be codified, and a waiver
of protection under the confirmation statute should expressly be
permitted by statute. The availability of this waiver, however, need not
be extended to principal borrowers or mortgagors, as they are the parties
the Georgia General Assembly intended to protect when first enacting
the statute. 167 To allow these parties to waive the statute would defeat
its purpose, as the statute was intended to protect the party owning the
encumbered property.6 8
Instead, focus should be directed to the enforceability of a waiver of
protection by commercial guarantors, as the General Assembly likely did
not intend to include them within the scope of protection under the
statute. Although the original enactment of Georgia's confirmation
statute "contains no reference to the financial depression," because
Georgia enacted the confirmation statute in 1935 (during the same time
period that other states enacted similar anti-deficiency statutes) it can
be inferred that the Georgia legislature enacted the statute for similar
reasons.'6 ' Anti-deficiency statutes enacted during the 1920s and
1930s served to protect the borrower after a foreclosure sale of the
borrower's property, wherein the borrower suffered two ill effects:

A.

First, he suffered the financial loss of having [his] property sold by, or
on behalf of, the lender to pay the borrower's defaulted indebtedness.
Then, to compound his woes, he was faced with the possibility that the
lender would obtain a deficiency judgment, representing the unsatisfied
portion of the indebtedness. Thus, after losing title to his property, all
of his remaining assets were potentially exposed to sale or levy to
satisfy the deficiency judgment.7 o

166. McQuiston, supra note 108, at 139.
167. See 1935 GA. H. JouRNAL 1759. Notice, as required under the confirmation
statute, was originally to be given to the "mortgagor, grantor, their heirs, legal
representatives, [and the] successors or assignees of [the] grantor or mortgagor." Id.
168. Iwan Renovations, Inc., 296 Ga. App. at 128, 673 S.E.2d at 635 (noting that "the
very purpose of the confirmation statute [is] to protect debtors from deficiency judgments
when their property is sold at [a] foreclosure sale for less than its market value." (first
alteration in original) (quoting Ward, 212 Ga. App. at 324, 441 S.E.2d at 693).
169. See Atl. Loan Co. v. Peterson, 181 Ga. 266, 273, 182 S.E. 15, 19 (1935); see also
1935 GA. H. JouRNAL 1759.
170. James B. Hughes, Jr., Taking Personal Responsibility: A Different View of
Mortgage Anti-Deficiency and Redemption Statutes, 39 ARIZ. L. REV. 117, 126 (1997).
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However, state legislatures did not intend to protect all debtors with
anti-deficiency legislation, but instead intended "to protect the homeowner and farmer against exaggerated deficiency judgments that resulted
from foreclosure sales of their properties at unreasonable prices.""'
Legislatures were "striving to preserve the life savings of homeowners
and farmers as embodied by the equity they possessed in their property."1 72 Concern for the individual homeowner or farmer during the
Depression was undeniably warranted, as "property rights in one's home
are so inextricably intertwined with the individual's sense of self and
well-being that they are deserving of special protection.",7 The home,
like other personal property, "is much more highly valued by the owner
than money is valued by the lender, and because the home is in fact
irreplaceable, the homeowner should not easily lose his home to repay
the lender."17 ' Because "homebuyers do not typically purchase real
estate for the purpose of making a profit," some state legislatures
explicitly limited protection under anti-deficiency legislation to
17
residential property.s
In contrast to residential mortgagors, commercial mortgagors
"purchase real estate [for the purpose of making a profit] and, therefore,
are better equipped to take the risks of deficiency judgments."'
Commercial borrowers do not have an intimate connection with their
property, as they "purchase real estate for the purpose of taking risks in
order to turn a profit." 7
If the commercial borrower defaults, it is typically because the project
itself was ill-conceived or incompetently carried out, with the result
that the investment is not worth saving. In contrast, default by the
residential purchaser is more likely to result from his personal
problems, rather than from decline in the intrinsic worth of the
property itself.7 8

171. Benjamin Gruberg, Note, When is a Mortgage GuaranteeNot Worth the Price of
a Notary?-The Incongruent Judicial Application of New York's Deficiency Judgment
Statute, 18 CARDOzO L. REV. 2053, 2099 (1997).
172.

Id.

173. Hughes, supra note 170, at 138.
174. Id.
175. Georgina W. Kwan, Comment, Mortgagor Protection Laws: A Proposal for
Mortgage ForeclosureReform in Hawai'i,24 U. HAW. L. REV. 245, 259 (2001).
176. Id.
177. G. Stephen Diab, Note,North CarolinaExtendsItsAnti-Deficiency Statute: Merritt
v. Edwards Ridge, 67 N.C. L. REV. 1446, 1456 (1989).
178. David A. Leipziger, Deficiency Judgments in California:The Supreme Court Tries
Again, 22 UCLA L. REV. 753, 774 (1975).
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One commentator noted that the New York legislature, when enacting
the state's anti-deficiency statute, was "not protecting individuals from
a losing business gamble or a deal gone sour, but from a national
economy in free-fall. The drafters of the 1933 legislation almost
certainly did not have commercial debtors in mind.""' Assuming that
the Georgia legislature enacted the confirmation statute for similar
reasons, it follows that Georgia's legislature did not actually intend to
protect commercial borrowers and certainly did not intend to protect
commercial guarantors; the primary concern of most anti-deficiency
legislation was the protection of homeowners and farmers from inflated
deficiency judgments.
Because it is now applied to protect commercial guarantors, the
confirmation statute has "disrupt[ed] traditional allocation of risk
concepts in commercial real estate transactions."'s For example, R.
Chris Belans, a commercial real estate developer, guaranteed a number
of commercial real estate loans throughout the years; many of the loans
were extended to a borrower-corporation of which Belans was either an
officer or president.'' Belans, therefore, was not a detached thirdparty when guaranteeing the loans. Belans, like other guarantors often
are, was "reluctant to perform under the guaranty."' 82 Under protection of the confirmation statute, Belans was successfully able to
extinguish his contractual obligations under the guaranty. For example,
in one case, the lender was forced to retain two special process servers
in an attempt to provide him with notice; one process server attempted
to serve notice at least twelve times at four different locations, while the
other server spent over sixty-five hours in an attempt to locate Belans,
which included seven visits and hours of surveillance at the home
believed to be his residence.'
The lender, who simply wanted to

179. Gruberg, supra note 171, at 2099.
180. Joel M. Craig, Note, Mortgages and Deeds of Trust-Ross Realty Co. v. First
Citizens Bank & Trust Co.: North CarolinaAnti-DeficiencyJudgment Statute BarsPersonal
Actions Against Purchase Money Mortgagors, 58 N.C. L. REV. 855, 865 (1980).
181. See 129 Acres, Inc. v. Atlanta Bus. Bank, 311 Ga. App. 462, 462-63, 716 S.E.2d
536, 536 (2011); Belans v. Bank of Am., NA., 309 Ga. App. 208, 208, 709 S.E.2d 853, 85455 (2011); Winstar Dev., Inc. v. SunTrust Bank, 308 Ga. App. 655, 655-56, 708 S.E.2d 604,
605-06 (2011); Pine Grove Builders, Inc. v. SunTrust Bank, 307 Ga. App. 764, 764-65, 706
S.E.2d 129, 130 (2011); Belans v. Bank of Am., N.A., 306 Ga. App. 252, 252-53, 701 S.E.2d
889, 889-90 (2010); Belans v. Bank of Am., NA., 303 Ga. App. 654, 654, 694 S.E.2d 725,
726-27 (2010); Belans v. Bank of Am., N.A., 303 Ga. App. 35, 35-36, 692 S.E.2d 694, 695
(2010).
182. See McQuiston, supra note 108, at 139.
183. Belans, 303 Ga. App. at 37-38, 692 S.E.2d at 696.
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recover the money extended to the borrower, had to resort to such
expensive means just to enforce Belans's contractual obligations.1as
The extension of the confirmation statute to guarantors can perhaps
be explained by judicial sympathy, as "Imlany of us are emotionally
attracted to the notion that because most lenders are big and powerful
institutions, they should not be permitted to assert their rights at the
However, a commercial-realexpense of the average consumer.""
estate guarantor (like Belans) is far from the "average consumer." In
fact, Georgia courts characterize the commercial guaranty as "a
negotiated arm's length business transaction between sophisticated
commercial parties."1 86 Like most guarantors of commercial real estate
loans, Belans was a real estate developer who was an officer of the
principal borrower. Guarantors like Belans can therefore be presumed
to be sufficiently sophisticated to understand that, when executing a
guaranty agreement, he was agreeing to be "legally bound to pay back
the loan if the borrower cannot or will not pay.""' This is precisely
the reason lenders require a guaranty prior to approving a loan,'88 as
"[tihe guarantor is required to perform only in the event of nonperformance by the debtor."89
Outside of the context of confirmation, Georgia courts typically enforce
the contractual guaranty as long as the "language employed by the
parties in the guaranty is plain, unambiguous, and capable of only one
reasonable interpretation."19 0 Commercial guarantors, as "educated,
successful businessperson[s] ,"e are therefore "free to obligate themselves in this manner as an inducement to lenders to make commercial
loans to them for use in the operation of their businesses."1 92 By
executing the guaranty, the guarantor "promises to pay the debt or
perform the obligations of another person."9 3 A guaranty agreement

184. See generally McQuiston, supra note 108, at 139.
185. Hughes, supra note 170, at 136.
186. Interstate Sec. Police, Inc. v. Citizens & S. Emory Bank, 237 Ga. 37, 38, 226
S.E.2d 583, 584 (1976).
187. Ndidi Onyebuchukwu, Note, Runaway Guarantors:Reevaluating the Scope of the
Sham GuarantyDefense, 45 Lov. L.A. L. REv. 1391, 1412 (2012).
188. Id. at 413.
189. George A. Nation m, Guaranty Agreements: Recent Cases Illustrate Common
Risks, 24 CoM. LENDING REV. 31, 31 (2009).
190. Hanna v. First Citizens Bank & Trust Co., 323 Ga. App. 321, 327-28, 744 S.E.2d
894, 899 (2013).
191. Id. at 328, 744 S.E.2d at 899.
192. InterstateSec. Police, Inc., 237 Ga. at 39, 226 S.E.2d at 585.
193. McQuiston, supra note 108, at 138.
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can help a real estate developer, who "may otherwise lack access to
commercial funding sources, to obtain a loan," as the guaranty helps
to ensure that the lender will receive prompt payment of amounts owed
to it under the underlying loan, even if the borrowing [obligor] encounters financial difficulties and fails to pay when due an amount owed
under the primary obligation agreement. The more confident the
[lender] is that it will be repaid, the more likely it is to make the loan,
and on better terms."e
Therefore, a guaranty provides the principal borrower with access to
capital that the borrower may not otherwise be able to obtain.
As the Georgia Supreme Court noted, "[o]ne who signs a written
document without reading it, unless prevented from doing so by some
fraud or artifice . . . is chargeable with knowledge of its contents"'

and therefore "must be held to know the terms of the guaranties they
had signed."' The lender often relies on the guaranty as "an effective
means to lessen a bank's risk when a loan becomes unrecoverable from
a borrower."9 s If a guarantor (such as Belans) is free to obligate
himself in this manner in order to induce the lender to extend a loan for
a commercial real estate investment, it is unclear why courts have
paternalistically allowed the commercial guarantor to evade his
otherwise enforceable contractual obligations.
Before the enactment of the confirmation statute,
the mortgagor bore the entire risk of a decline in the value of property
and the mortgagee often became unjustly enriched. Upon default by
the mortgagor, the seller-mortgagee retained the mortgagor's downpayment, any regular payments made by the mortgagor, clear title to the
land, and a judgment enforeceable against the mortgagor's other
assets.1 9e
The enactment of Georgia's confirmation statute "reallocated the risk
between the parties, placing the risk of a decline in property values on

194. SANDRA M. ROCKS, CONSULTATIVE GRouP To ASSIST THE POOR, THE WORLD BANK
FOUNDATION USA, PROVISIONS OF STANDARD COMMERCIAL GUARANTEE
AGREEMENTS, at 2, availableat http://www.microrate.com/media/does/tools/GuaranteeAgreementsTG.pdf.
195. Id. at 3.
196. Musgrove v. Muagrove, 213 Ga. 610, 612, 100 S.E.2d 577, 579 (1957).
197. Citizens & S. Nat? Bank v. Yeager Enters., 247 Ga. 797, 799, 279 S.E.2d 674, 676
(1981).
198. McQuiston, supra note 108, at 138.
199. Stacey D. Cowley, Note, Real Property-NorthCarolina'sAnti-Deficiency Statute:
Is Suing on the Note a Lost Option?-Barnaby v. Boardman, 22 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 389,
394 (1987).
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With regard to this reallocation of risk, one

Property owners whose property is fully leveraged would have little
economic incentive to continue servicing the debt or expending money
to maintain and repair the property. In addition, anti-deficiency
legislation inappropriately shifts the risk of market fluctuations from
the owner to the lender, who must absorb losses but forego gains in the
value of the property. Efficiency and fairness dictate that the
fluctuation of value must remain with the borrower as owner."0o
As evidenced by Belans's abuse of the confirmation statute to escape his
contractual obligations, "anti-deficiency statutes [have served as]
legislatively provided real estate finance 'mulligans' which permit
mortgagors to avoid some of the negative consequences of bad luck, their
own faulty decision making, or irresponsibility."202
By shifting the risk of real estate ventures to the lender, particularly
with respect to commercial guarantors, smaller lending institutions
became overburdened with the inability to recover on commercial real
estate loans.20 3 Within the past decade, larger institutions "increased
their market share for consumer loans, credit cards, and residential
mortgages," while smaller banks have "increasingly moved toward
providing commercial real estate . . . loans."204 According to the
United States Government Accountability Office's study on bank
failures, the "failures of small and medium-size banks were largely
associated with high concentrations of [commercial real estate]
loans. 2 05 These smaller banks are the major source of credit for small
businesses,206 and "in the wake of the bank failures, underwriting
standards had tightened, making it harder for some borrowers who may
have been able to obtain loans prior to the bank failures ... to obtain
[loans] afterward."0 7 Therefore, the inability of a lender to recover
from a guarantor of a commercial real estate loan not only negatively
impacts the lender, but also makes it more difficult for other borrowers
to obtain loans. 208 Given the fact that Georgia has experienced the

200. Cf id. (describing the effect of North Carolina's anti-deficiency statute).
201. Basil H. Mattingly, The Shift From Power to Process:A FunctionalApproach to
ForeclosureLaw, 80 MARQ. L. REV. 77, 105-06 (1996).
202. Hughes, supra note 170, at 123 (citations omitted).
203. See GAO REPORT, supra note 1, at 9.
204. Id.
205. Id. at 17.
206. Marsh, supra note 11, at 371.
207. GAO REPORT, supra note 1, at 52.
208. See Mattingly, supra note 201, at 106.
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highest number of bank failures in the nation, serious consideration
should be given before allowing courts to continue broadly applying the
confirmation statute, particularly to guarantors of commercial real estate
loans.

B. 1)ue Market Value Defense
The legislature could also consider providing the debtor with a true
market value defense, similar to that available to debtors in North
Carolina. Georgia's confirmation statute was "designed 'to protect
debtors from deficiency judgments when the forced sale of their property
brings less than the fair market value [and] is limited to determining
whether the sale was properly advertised and brought the fair market
value of the land.' 20 9 The Georgia Supreme Court has readily recognized that the statute fulfills its purpose "by requiring speedy judicial
review of the notice, advertisement, and regularity of the sale; insuring
that the property sold for a fair value; and protecting debtors from
deficiency judgments when the forced sale brings a price lower than fair
market value."210 In other words, the confirmation hearing "provides
debtors with formidable protection against gross deficiency judgments,""x but at the same time, it should be an efficient process.
Given the ambiguities in the confirmation statute, which are left to
various interpretations by the courts, confirmation proceedings are
anything but efficient.
As the Georgia Supreme Court has noted, "[tihe only purpose of the
confirmation statute is to subject the creditor's potential deficiency claim
to the condition that the foreclosure sale under power be given judicial
approval.'"212 Therefore, confirmation proceedings "merely invokeD the
superior court's supervisory authority over non-judicial foreclosure
sales,"1 a and act "as a condition precedent to an action for a deficiency
judgment.""' Further, a confirmation proceeding does not result in "a
personal judgment and it does not adjudicate the title of the property
sold[, elxcept as to the confirmed amount of the sale, it does not

209. Hudson Trio, LLC v. Buckhead Cmty. Bank, 304 Ga. App. 324, 332, 696 S.E.2d
372, 378-79 (2010) (alteration in original) (quoting Dorsey v. Mancuso, 249 Ga. App. 259,
261, 547 S.E.2d 787, 789 (2001)).
210. Alliance Partners v. Harris Trust & Say. Bank, 266 Ga. 514, 514, 467 S.E.2d 531,
532 (1996).
211. Friedman v. Regions Bank, 288 Ga. App. 57, 58, 653 S.E.2d 507, 509 (2007).
212. VLass, 263 Ga. at 297, 430 S.E.2d at 734 (quoting Kunes, 230 Ga. at 890, 199
S.E.2d at 778).
213. Id.
214. Commercial Exch. Bank v. Johnson, 197 Ga. App. 529, 530, 398 S.E.2d 817, 819
(1990) (citing Windland Co. v. FDIC, 151 Ga. App. 742, 743, 261 S.E.2d 407, 408 (1979)).
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establish the liability of any party with regards to the indebtedness."
If the ultimate purpose of confirmation proceedings is to merely trigger
the lender's right to pursue a deficiency judgment, the two can arguably
be consolidated into one.
In North Carolina, a state with fewer bank failures than Georgia,
debtors are provided essentially the same protection from liability for
gross judgments, as debtors are permitted to assert a defense of true
market value if sued for a deficiency after foreclosure. The North
Carolina statute states:
When any sale of real estate has been made by a mortgagee, trustee,
or other person authorized to make the same, at which the mortgagee,
payee or other holder of the obligation thereby secured becomes the
purchaser and takes title either directly or indirectly, and thereafter
such mortgagee, payee or other holder of the secured obligation, as
aforesaid, shall sue for and undertake to recover a deficiency judgment
against the mortgagor, trustor or other maker of any such obligation
whose property has been so purchased, it shall be competent and
lawful for the defendant against whom such deficiency judgment is
sought to allege and show as matter of defense and offset, but not by
way of counterclaim, that the property sold was fairly worth the
amount of the debt secured by it at the time and place of sale or that
the amount bid was substantially less than its true value, and, upon
such showing, to defeat or offset any deficiency judgment against him,
either in whole or in part: Provided, this section shall not affect nor
apply to the rights of other purchasers or of innocent third parties, nor
shall it be held to affect or defeat the negotiability of any note, bond or
other obligation secured by such mortgage, deed of trust or other
instrument: Provided, further, this section shall not apply to foreclosure sales made pursuant to an order or decree of court nor to any
judgment sought or rendered in any foreclosure suit nor to any sale
made and confirmed prior to [the effective date of the act].216
Therefore, a "mortgagor, trustor or other maker of any such obligation
whose property has been so purchased" can raise the defense to "defeat
or offset any deficiency judgment against him, either in whole or in
part."217 Further, the defense is limited to situations wherein the
lender "becomes the purchaser" of the property and thereafter sues to
"recover a deficiency judgment against the mortgagor, trustor or other
maker of any such obligation."M To raise the defense, the debtor must

215.
S.E.2d
216.
217.
218.

Harris & Tilley, Inc. v. First Nat'l Bank of Cartersville, 157 Ga. App. 88, 91, 276
137, 141 (1981) (internal citations omitted).
N.C. GEN. STAT. § 45-21.36 (2011).
Id.
Id.
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allege that "the property sold was fairly worth the amount of the debt
secured by it at the time and place of sale or that the amount bid was
substantially less than its true value.""'9
The true market value defense accomplishes the same objective as the
confirmation statute, as the statute was intended "to protect debtors
from deficiency judgments when their property is sold at foreclosure sale
for less than its market value."22 0 Allowing the debtor to raise the
defense in an action for a deficiency is likely the most equitable solution
to the problems associated with the confirmation statute. Under the
current application of the confirmation statute, if a court determines
that the true market value of property is more than the purchase price
of the property at the foreclosure sale, the lender is absolutely barred
from pursuing a deficiency.221 Georgia courts are currently not
permitted to "adjust the amount that would be due on the primary debt
by seeking and obtaining the bank's agreement to credit the debtor's
account with the true market value as determined by the superior
court."222 Therefore, under the current statute, if a court's determination of true market value is greater than the lender's determination of
such value, the lender is absolutely precluded from obtaining any
recovery.
Under North Carolina law, guarantors who do not hold a property
interest in the encumbered property are not entitled to assert the
defense of true market value. For example, in a recent North Carolina
Court of Appeals case, Wells FargoBank, N.A. v. Arlington Hills of Mint
Hill, LLC,223 the court of appeals held that a guarantor was not
entitled to assert a true market value defense in the deficiency
action."
This case involved a typical commercial loan transaction.
The borrower, Arlington Hills of Mint Hill, LLC (Arlington Hills),
obtained a loan from Wells Fargo (the Bank) to acquire and develop a

219. Id. In North Carolina, this defense is inapplicable to "purchase money mortgage
transactions wherein the seller of the property finances the buyer's purchase." Synovus
Bank v. Coleman, 887 F. Supp. 2d 659, 674 (W.D.N.C. 2012); see generallyN.C. GEN. STAT.
§ 45-21.38 (2011). In such seller-financed transactions, the seller is not permitted to
pursue a deficiency judgment after a non-judicial foreclosure sale of the property. N.C.
GEN. STAT. § 45-21.38. Deficiency judgments are, however, permitted in transactions "in
which a buyer receives financing from a third-party lender." Synovus Bank, 887 F. Supp.
2d at 674. Smaller lending institutions likely will not be the seller-financier of property
but rather will be a third-party lender entitled to pursue a deficiency judgment.
220. Ward, 212 Ga. at 324, 441 S.E.2d at 693.
221. See generally Iwan Renovations Inc., 296 Ga. App. at 125, 673 S.E.2d at 632.
222. Rooster Youngblood Constr., Inc. v. Bank of Hiawassee, 320 Ga. App. 338, 338,739
S.E.2d 788, 789 (2013).
223. 742 S.E.2d 201 (N.C. CL App. 2013).
224. Id. at 205.
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residential subdivision. The guarantor executed an unconditional
guaranty in favor of the Bank for the "timely payment and performance
of all liabilities and obligations of [Arlington Hills] to [the] Bank."'
Although the guarantor argued that he was entitled to assert the true
market defense to offset the deficiency, the court, pointing to the
language of the statute, noted that the "statute explicitly limits the
defense to situations in which the mortgagee sues 'to recover a deficiency
judgment against the mortgagor, trustor, or other maker of any such
2
Therefore, under
obligation whose property has been so purchased.'""
the express terms of the statute, only "persons who hold a property
interest in the mortgaged property" are entitled to assert the defense,
and guarantors are not permitted to assert the defense. 22 7

Similarly, in Poughkeepsie Savings Bank, FSB v. Harris," the
United States District Court for the Western District of North Carolina
held that the anti-deficiency statute was unavailable to a guarantor in
a lender's action to enforce the guaranty agreement. 2 In that case,
the guarantors claimed that they were entitled to raise the defense
because they owned the encumbered property as partners of the
borrower corporation, and "the manner in which they .. . are being sued
is a distinction without a difference." 230 The district court rejected this
argument by noting that "[w]hile Defendants were partners who owned
the property, they were also both guarantors of the note.""a Although
the guarantors were indeed owners of the property as partners, they
were not sued by the lender as property owners on the note but instead
were "sued to enforce their duties as a guarantor" under the separate
guaranty agreement.2 32
The district court reasoned: "To permit Defendants to raise a defense
only available to them in their capacity as owners, when they are being
sued for their duties as guarantors, would erase their duty as guarantors. 233 When deciding to act as a guarantor for a loan that would
benefit them as partners of the borrower-entity, "they thought the
distinction they made between their role as owners and guarantors was
at least important enough to warrant [the lender's] decision to loan them

225. Id. at 202.
226. Id. at 204 (quoting Raleigh Fed. Say. Bank v. Godwin, 394 S.E.2d 294, 296 (N.C.
Ct. App. 1990)).
227. Raleigh Fed. Say. Bank, 394 S.E.2d at 296.
228. 833 F. Supp. 551 (W.D.N.C. 1993).
229. Id. at 555.
230. Id. at 553-54 (quoting Defs.' Br.).
231. Id. at 553.
232. Id. at 554.
233. Id.
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$3,900,000."23 Because the guarantors willingly chose to distinguish
their roles as property owners from their role as guarantors as an
inducement to obtain the loan, they were estopped from denying this
distinction in a suit to enforce the separate obligation."
Nevertheless, guarantors undeniably have an interest in ensuring that
the property sold for at least its true market value, as the guarantor
remains liable for the debt."' For that reason, Nevada allows guarantors to contest the true market value of the property. In Nevada,
"[blefore awarding a deficiency judgment," a court must conduct a
hearing and "take evidence presented by either party concerning the fair
market value of the property sold as of the date of foreclosure sale.""'
Unlike the problems associated with Georgia's confirmation statute,
which not only allows guarantors to contest true market value in
confirmation proceedings but also absolutely bars recovery from the
guarantor if that guarantor prevails, Nevada allows a court to "ascertain
the fair and reasonable market value of the encumbered premises at the
date of sale and to deduct said sum from the amount due on the
deficiency in order to ascertain the correct amount of the deficiency.""
Although Nevada's anti-deficiency legislation requires a hearing similar
to that required under Georgia's confirmation statute, the result of that
hearing does not affect the lender's right to pursue a deficiency but
rather affects the amount of recovery.239
"[Aill parties against whom the creditor may seek a deficiency
judgment" have an interest in determining the true market value of
encumbered property, as such value determines the value of the
deficiency.o If guarantors are not entitled to assert the true market
value defense, the potential exists for "an unscrupulous lender to bid an
insignificant price for real property of a true and sufficient value to
satisfy the debt it secured[] and then pursue a second essentially full
satisfaction from a financially responsible guarantor.""
Such a
situation would "unfairly enrich the lender at the expense of the
guarantor." 2

234. Id.
235. Id.
236. Because guarantors are liable for the outstanding balance, which is reduced by the
amount the property brought at the foreclosure sale, they have an interest in the property
bringing at least its fair market value at the sale.
237. NEV. REV. STAT. ANN. § 40.457(1) (Lexis-Nexis 2002).
238. Holloway v. Barrett, 487 P.2d 501, 504 (Nev. 1971).
239. See NEv. REV. STAT. ANN. § 40.457(1).
240. First Interstate Bank of Nev. v. Shields, 730 P.2d 429, 431 (Nev. 1986).
241. Id.
242. Id.
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Allowing the guarantor to assert the defense is different from allowing
the guarantor to be protected under Georgia's current confirmation
statute. Under the current statute, guarantors have the ability to
completely eradicate their contractual obligations to the lender. If
allowed to assert a true market value defense, a guarantor likely will be
unable to walk away financially unharmed from his obligations.
Instead, the guarantor will simply be permitted to contest the amount
of his obligations. Further, this solution would not unfairly enrich the
guarantor at the expense of the lender as the current confirmation
statute enables guarantors to do. By amending the anti-deficiency
protections, the contractual obligations of all the parties can be upheld,
as the true market value defense would allow parties to limit, but not
eradicate, those obligations. Doing so will lessen lenders' burdens from
commercial real estate loans and therefore has the potential to reduce
the number of failures among lending institutions.
V.

CONCLUSION

Given the broad application of the confirmation statute by Georgia
courts, lenders have found it increasingly difficult to enforce their
contractual securities, in particular, guaranty agreements. This
difficulty in recovery negatively impacted a number of Georgia lenders,
especially smaller community banks, leading to Georgia experiencing the
highest number of bank failures in the nation during the recent
recession. Instead of subjecting the lender's right to a deficiency to a
confirmation hearing, it may be wise to consider explicitly codifying the
decision in HWA Properties, at least with respect to commercial
guarantors, to allow lenders to obtain the benefit they bargained for. In
the alternative, the confirmation hearing could be replaced with the
more equitable alternative of a true market value defense. This defense
would be available for the debtor (including both the principal borrower
and the guarantor) to assert during the deficiency action. This would
serve to protect debtors from potential abuse by the lender, as the court
would limit the deficiency judgment to the difference between the court's
determination of true market value and the remaining obligation.
Further, unlike the confirmation statute, the defense would also protect
the lender's interests, as an action for a deficiency would not be barred
if a court determines the property did not sell for true market value.
Instead, the lender's deficiency judgment would simply be limited by the
court's determination of true market value. As it currently stands, the
confirmation statute is being abused by borrowers, particularly
commercial guarantors, and is utilized unfairly to force the traditional
risks associated with real estate ventures on the lender. Smaller lenders
have been unable to shoulder the burden of such risks, and as a result,
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a number of them have failed within recent years. The Georgia
legislature should consider reformulating Georgia's anti-deficiency
legislation, keeping both the debtor and the lender's interests in mind,
as inequitably favoring the debtor over the lender may limit lenders'
ability to "foster economic growth and serve their communities, boost
small businesses, and help increase individual savings."2 43
The requirement that a confirmation hearing act as a condition
precedent to an action for a deficiency should be altered to consolidate
the confirmation hearing with the action for the deficiency, wherein the
court hears evidence of true market value and determines the amount
of the deficiency judgment from its determination of the property's true
market value. If the true market value defense is adopted, the
foreclosure sale will still be subject to judicial scrutiny, and the debtor
will be protected from a "gross deficiency judgment,"which was the
Georgia Assembly's exact intent when enacting the confirmation statute
in 1935.
DIANNA LEE

243.

155 CONG. REc. 677 (statement of Rep. Ruben Hinojosa).

